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Pothos and Busemeyer argue that quantum probability (QP) provides a descriptive 
model of behaviour and can also provide a rational analysis of a task. We discuss QP 
models using Marr’s levels of analysis, arguing that they make most sense as 
algorithmic level theories. We also highlight the importance of having clear 
interpretations for basic mechanisms such as interference. 
Main text:
What kind of explanation does a cognitive model offer? A standard way of approaching 
this question is to use Marr’s (1982) three levels of explanation. A “computational 
analysis” provides an abstract description of the problem that the learner must solve, 
along with a normative account of how that problem should be solved. Bayesian models 
of cognition are usually computational level explanations. An “algorithmic level” 
explanation describes a mechanistic process that would produce human-like behaviour 
in some task. Most traditional information processing models and many connectionist 
models lie at this level of explanation. Finally, “implementation level” explanations 
propose a low level physical explanation of how the brain might perform the 
computations that are required. These are the kinds of models typically pursued in 
cognitive neuroscience. 
Whereabouts in this classification scheme should we place the quantum probability 
(QP) framework? The implementation level is the simplest to consider. Pothos and 
Busemeyer explicitly disavow any implementation level interpretation of these models; 
making a clear distinction between their work on the formal modelling of cognition 
using a quantum formalism and those researchers (e.g., Hameroff 1988) who argue that 
neural function should be modelled as a quantum physical system. We agree with this 
distinction.
Should QP models be treated as computational level analyses? Although Pothos and 
Busemeyer make explicit comparisons to classical probability and to Bayesian models, 
we do not think it makes sense to treat QP models as computational level analyses. The 
critical characteristic of a computational analysis is to specify what problem the learner 
is solving, and to present a normative account of how that problem should be solved. 
Bayesian models work well as computational analyses because of the fact that classical 
probability provides good rules for probabilistic inference in everyday life. In 
discussing this issue, Pothos and Busemeyer point to problems associated with 
statistical decision theory (e.g., that Dutch books are possible in some cases), or to well 
known issues with the Kolmogorov axioms (e.g., sample spaces are hard to define in 
real world contexts). However, in our view their discussion misses the forest for the 
trees: showing that classical probability has limitations does not establish QP as a 
plausible alternative. There is a good reason why statistics is built on top of classical 
probability and not quantum probability: it is the right tool for the job of defining 
normative inferences in everyday data analysis. In contrast, although there are such 
things as "quantum t-tests" (e.g., Kumagai & Hayashi 2011), they have yet to find a 
natural role within everyday statistical analysis. It is possible that such usage may 
emerge in time, but we think this is unlikely, simply because the situations to which 
such tools are applicable (e.g., data follow a quantum Gaussian distribution) do not 
arise very often when analysing real data. Until statistical tools based on QP find a place 
in everyday data analysis, we remain unconvinced that QP makes sense as a normative 
account of everyday inference.
What about the algorithmic level? Here, we think that Pothos are Busemeyer are on 
more solid ground: there is some justification for thinking about QP models as 
mechanistic accounts. Consider the model used to account for Shafir and Tversky’s 
(1992) data on the prisoner’s dilemma. It relies on an interference effect to account for 
the fact that participants defect whenever the opponent’s action is known but co-operate 
when it is unknown. This interference does not emerge as part of an optimal solution to 
the inference problem given to the decision maker, nor is it characterised at a neural 
level. It is clearly intended to refer to a psychological mechanism of some kind. 
In view of this, a mechanistic view of QP seems to provide the right way forward, but 
at times it is difficult to understand what the mechanisms actually are. To take a simple 
example, why are some questions incompatible and others are compatible? Pothos and 
Busemeyer suggest that “[a] heuristic guide of whether some questions should be 
considered compatible or not is whether clarifying one is expected to interfere with the 
evaluation of the other”. This seems sensible, but it begs the question. One is naturally 
led to ask why some psychological states interfere and others do not. This is difficult to 
answer because the QP formalism is silent on how its central constructs (e.g., 
interference) map onto psychological mechanisms. In our own work (Fuss & Navarro, 
under review) we have explored this issue in regards to the dynamic equations that 
describe how quantum states change over time. Specifically, we have sought to describe 
how these equations could arise from mechanistic processes, but our solution is specific 
to a particular class of models and we do not claim to have solved the problem in 
general. In our view, understanding how formalisms map onto mechanisms is one of 
the biggest open questions within the QP framework.
In short, we think that the potential in QP lies in developing sensible, interpretable 
psychological mechanisms that can account for the otherwise puzzling inconsistencies 
in human decision making. It might be that human cognition cannot be described using 
the standard provided by classical probability theory, but turns out to be more consistent 
with QP theory. That doesn’t make QP a good tool for rational analysis, but it would 
make it an interesting psychological mechanism, particularly if it is possible to provide 
clear and consistent interpretations for its central constructs. Should events unfold in 
this way, then statistics would continue to rely on classical probability for its theoretical 
foundation, but cognitive modellers could use quantum probability in many instances. 
There is nothing incompatible about these two states.  
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